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New Zealand Defence Force
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New Zealand

OIA-2023-4863

20 December 2023



Dear 

I refer to your email of 13 November 2023 requesting, under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA),

...the accident report for Harvard 1010 which crashed 28 October 1965 near Lee's line Fielding.

The declassified part of the Court of Inquiry around the crash of Harvard NZ1010, is the Comment on the Findings. This document has been authorised for release by Chief of Air Force in accordance with section 200T of the Armed Forces Discipline Act. The document is at Enclosure 1. Where indicated, information has been withheld in accordance with section 9(2)(ba)(i) of the OIA, as the release of such information would be likely to prejudice the supply of similar information and it is in the public interest that such information should continue to be supplied. Signatures have been withheld in accordance with section 9(2)(k) to prevent the malicious or inappropriate use of staff information.

You have the right, under section 28(3) of the OIA, to ask an Ombudsman to review this response to your request. Information about how to make a complaint is available at www.ombudsman.parliament.nz or freephone 0800 802 602.

Please note that responses to official information requests are proactively released where possible. This response to your request will be published shortly on the NZDF website, with your personal information removed.

Yours sincerely

AJ WOODS

Air Commodore

Chief of Staff HQNZDF

Enclosure:

1. Court of Inquiry information

Do/88 Draft comments as requested.

s.9(2)(k)

s.9(2)(k)

5/16

op (1/14)

AFT

COMMENTS ON THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF
INQUIRY INTO THE ACCIDENT INVOLVING
HARVARD NZ 1010 ON 28 OCTOBER 1965

1. General. The Court has been reconvened on direction from AMP for the following reasons:

- (a) The Court did not meet the terms of reference (no recommendations)
- (b) The evidence from Sqn Ldr s.9(2)(ba)(i) called for recommendations.

2. Comments. From a study of the findings of the Court it is possible to follow closely the events leading up to the accident. It would appear that all relevant points have been covered and the following facts emerge:

(a) Pilot - Pilot Officer L.W. Fitzmaurice.

1. Harvard Experience

Total	116.55 1st pilot
	1.55 2nd pilot
	116.25 dual
Previous 6 mths	55.35 1st pilot
	1.55 2nd pilot
	.50 dual

2. Attitude. A thorough, responsible and mature young officer who approached his flying in a serious manner.

3. Flying Assessment. Average, but had difficulty in recognising spins and stalls during training.

(b) Supervision. This is somewhat of a contentious point.

The full briefing for the exercise was carried out on 12 October 1965 some 16 days prior to the incident. While this may seem a considerable period before the flight, this was one of pure repetition and for all intents and purposes should have been adequate. Additionally a weather briefing was carried out on

the day in question and the flight authorised by a VIP pilot (as is the custom when OC and flight commanders are absent) at 1000 hrs. s.9(2)(ba)(i)

- (c) Exercise. The exercise was PAR let downs VFR for the training of Air Traffic Controllers. The standard briefing sheet is shown at Appendix 'D' which allows for some standard deviations from the normal PAR.
- (d) Weather. The weather while marginal to the East, according to evidence was satisfactory from 4½ miles on finals for PAR on Runway 27. The controller continually impressed on the pilot that the exercise should be abandoned if he could not maintain VFR.
- (e) The Flight. There were several discussions between the controller and the pilot mainly about the weather conditions and the number of PAR's that could be accomplished. From the transcription of the tape recording, it was found that while most of the PAR's were done at a reasonable speed, the final one completed gave a ground speed of some 53 kts. The wind at the time was 280/10 with a south easterly drift early on the approach in the Mt Stewart area.
- (f) Eye Witness Reports. The reports from eye witnesses leave little doubt as to the cause of the accident. i.e. The aircraft entered a spin at such a height that the pilot was unable to recover fully before striking the ground. From the reports and the expert opinion of the Chief Inspector of Accidents who examined the wreckage, it can be assumed that the aircraft had recovered from the spin prior to the crash. Also from the eye witness reports and the examination of the wreckage, it was possible to ascertain that 200 flap was lowered and the propellor

was in fine pitch and under power on impact. This would indicate that the pilot was flying in the bad weather configuration. However, witness reports indicate a high nose attitude which is not associated with this configuration at the recommended speed for bad weather low flying. Indicating that the pilot was flying at a greatly reduced airspeed.

3. Conclusion.

(a) Cause. The aircraft entered a spin at such a height that the pilot was unable to recover prior to striking the ground. Why the aircraft entered the spin, is open to conjecture, but it would appear from the evidence that the pilot was extending the limit to which he was briefed to vary the PAR letdowns in as much as he completed a PAR at a speed close to the stall. The reason for this low airspeed is hard to establish, but it would appear that the pilot was trying to see how slow he could fly a PAR hoping that he would confuse the controllers. It can only be assumed that on overshoot from the last PAR the pilot did not increase the airspeed but continued with 20° flap climbing for the downwind leg. ~~THIS EXAMPLE WILL BE USED~~
~~IN THE EXAMPLES WHICH ARE USED TO ILLUSTRATE THE~~
~~CONCEPTS OF THE COURSE. THIS FACT COUPLED WITH WHAT MUST~~
This fact coupled with what must have been a poor horizon, could have been enough to disorientate the pilot on the transition from instruments to visual causing the nose high attitude and the spin.

Conjecture

s.9(2)(ba)(i)




s.9(2)(ba)(i)



Para 3

s.9(2)(k)



s.9(2)(k)



(C.W. RUDD)
Sqn Ldr

29 Nov 65