



Headquarters
New Zealand Defence Force
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New Zealand

OIA-2023-4737

23 June 2023

Dear [REDACTED]

I refer to your email of 12 May 2023 to the Ministry of Defence seeking information on Russia, Ukraine and New Zealand's international relations. In accordance with the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA), the below parts of your request were transferred to the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) for consideration:

7. *What reports do you have regarding the military capabilities of the Ukrainians currently?*
8. *What reports do you have regarding the military capabilities of the Russians currently?*
11. *What intelligence briefings happened and what sources do they come from regarding the Ukraine-Russia conflict?*
12. *With respect to Q11. What audits or due diligence happens with such briefings?*
13. *Is the current kill ratio approximately 7 Ukrainians per 1 Russian during the Ukraine-Russia conflict?.*

Information on foreign military capability may be contained in intelligence reports. Details about, and the information contained within those reports are withheld in full in accordance with section 6(a) and 6(b) of the OIA. NZDF intelligence briefs and products are prepared and delivered in accordance with the *New Zealand Defence Intelligence Guidelines: Analytic Standards*. A copy of this is provided at Enclosure 1. The name of the Chief of Intelligence is withheld in accordance with section 6(a) of the OIA.

You have the right, under section 28(3) of the OIA, to ask an Ombudsman to review this response to your request. Information about how to make a complaint is available at www.ombudsman.parliament.nz or freephone 0800 802 602.

Please note that responses to official information requests are proactively released where possible. This response to your request will be published shortly on the NZDF website, with your personal information removed.

Yours sincerely

AJ WOODS
Air Commodore
Chief of Staff HQNZDF

Enclosure:

1. *New Zealand Defence Intelligence Guidelines: Analytical Standards, June 2016*



NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE GUIDELINES: ANALYTIC STANDARDS

Reference:

A. Defence Force Order 116(1), Chapter 3, *New Zealand Defence Force Intelligence Capability*

Aim

1. These guidelines establish the New Zealand Defence Intelligence analytic standards for the production of analytical intelligence products.

Technical control

2. In accordance with Reference A, the Chief of Defence Intelligence has technical control of intelligence capability within the New Zealand Defence Force and is the approving authority for analytic standards.

Analytic standards

3. Intelligence produced by New Zealand Defence Intelligence is to conform to the following analytic standards:
- a. **Relevance:** In order for intelligence to be relevant it should be formulated to directly support and inform decisions. Intelligence production will in many cases be the result of a stated intelligence requirement. To add value to decision-making, products should show decision-makers the implications, or the 'so what', of the reporting.
 - b. **Objectivity:** Producing intelligence in an objective manner is a key principle of all-source assessment.
 - (1) Analysts must be aware of their personal assumptions or analytical prejudices and ensure their own biases are not reflected in their product. Where appropriate, the use of analytical techniques that assist in reducing bias should be used. Analysts must be open to considering alternative or contrary information.


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- (2) Assessment and the presentation of intelligence must be free from influence or advocacy. It must not be distorted to conform to a desired result or promote a particular course of action or policy.
- c. **Usability:** Intelligence must be in a format that is usable to decision-makers. The content and product style should be selected based on user requirements and preferences. Write-for-release is an important element of modern intelligence practice and the classification of a product must be carefully considered to allow dissemination to reach as wide an audience as possible.
- d. **Timeliness:** Intelligence should be available in time for it to support decision-making. Analysts should remain aware of events or schedules that will influence policy or operational decisions.
- e. **All-source intelligence:** Assessments should be based on all available information and intelligence. Where key information gaps exist, these can be noted in the product. To ensure all relevant information has been incorporated and assumptions checked, analysts should actively collaborate with partner agencies.
- f. **Security and legal requirements:** Correct security measures must be applied to intelligence products in order to protect sources and prevent the unauthorised disclosure of information. Analysts must adhere to any legal framework that pertains to the information they are using.
- g. **The production of intelligence must demonstrate a high level of analytical tradecraft, including:**
 - (1) **Sources and underlying information are critically analysed.** The sources that have provided information, the information itself, and any analytical methodology used must be critically assessed for quality, credibility and suitability. Sources should be sufficiently described to allow subsequent users to understand the strength and weakness of the sources used. Source references are applied to drafts and when appropriate to released products.
 - (2) **There is a clear distinction between the underlying information, existing intelligence and the analyst's own assumptions and assessments.** Analytic products should clearly distinguish between the underlying information used and assumptions or assessments. Assumptions are defined as suppositions used to frame or support an argument. Assessments are defined as conclusions based on underlying intelligence information, analysis and assumptions.
 - (3) **Assessment is anticipatory.** Assessments add value by being forward looking. In order to do this, assessments will usually be predictive.

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Assessment should not simply restate the facts or present obvious conclusions.

- (4) **Assessments are formed using logical argument.** Analysts should formulate assessments in a product through logical and coherent reasoning. In some cases this may require the analyst to act as a storyteller to ensure the decision-maker understands the development of the situation or how an assessment has been reached. This is most important when an assessment incorporates a number of courses of action or alternative analysis. Analysts must exercise care when determining what information to include in a report and what to leave out. If a reviewer requires aspects of the draft to be explained to them, it is very likely the product needs to be adjusted.
- (5) **Assessments exhibit consistency over time.** When the drivers of the assessment remain the same, the assessment should be consistent over time and across products. If there is a change to the underlying information, or a reassessment brings about an adjustment to the analysis, this should be highlighted and the reason for the change explained.
- (6) **Likelihood is correctly expressed.** The probability that a course of action will occur is expressed through the use of the language of uncertainty.

Language of uncertainty					
Remote/ Highly Unlikely	Improbable/ Unlikely	Realistic Possibility	Probable/ Likely	Highly/ Very Probably/ Likely	Almost certain
<10%	15-20%	25-50%	55-70%	75-85%	>90%
					
Decreasing likelihood			Increasing likelihood		

- (7) **Analysts express their confidence in an assessment or judgment by the use of confidence levels.** Confidence levels should, however, be applied sparingly and generally only used when there is a clear requirement or where it will add value.

Confidence levels	
Confidence level	General criteria
High Confidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The underlying information is well corroborated by proven sources. A strong understanding of the issue exists. There is a negligible risk of deception. There are minimal assumptions. There is a mix of strong logical inferences developed through multiple analytic techniques or methodologies.

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Moderate Confidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The underlying information is partially corroborated by good sources. A moderate understanding of the issue exists. There is some risk of deception.• Several assumptions are made; some are critical to the analysis.• There is a mix of strong and weak inferences developed through a single analytic technique or methodology.
Low Confidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The underlying information is uncorroborated by good or marginal sources. There is a limited understanding of the issue. There is a considerable risk of deception.• Many assumptions are made; most are critical to the analysis.• The reasoning is dominated by weak inferences developed through few analytic techniques or methodologies.

When appropriate, additional information such as a source summary can be provided in a text box regarding the overall intelligence base for the assessment. This is most likely to be necessary with a large body of work, a new line of reporting, or the presentation of a controversial or key assessment.

- (8) **Expression is clear and appropriate.** Language in intelligence products must be clear, concise and presented in a manner that the audience can read easily and fully understand. Plain language is to be used. Decision-makers must not be left in doubt as to the key assessments. Titles should reflect the content, clearly state what the product is about and provide information that assists in the discovery of the product in a database.

Commonality of tradecraft and the relationship with intelligence partners' standards: The New Zealand Defence Intelligence Analytic Standards incorporate relevant elements from partner organisations' standards in order to promote commonality of tradecraft and increase the effectiveness of collaboration with other New Zealand intelligence agencies and international partners.

s. 6(a)

Brigadier
Chief of Defence Intelligence
New Zealand Defence Force